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Relations, University of Southampton, UK
ABSTRACT
The role of political socialization in explaining disengagement from specific
modes of activism beyond voting remains largely unexplored, limited to date
by available data and methods. While most previous studies have tended to
propose explanations for disengagement linked to specific repertoires of
political action, we propose a unified theory based on the different
socialization experiences of subsequent generations. We test this theory using
a new dataset of collated waves of the British Social Attitudes Survey and by
applying age–period–cohort models for repeated cross-sectional data and
generalized additive models to identify generational effects. We show that
generational effects underlie the participatory decline across repertoires.
Consistent with our expectations, the results reveal that the generation of
“Thatcher’s Children” are much less likely to engage in a range of repertoires
of political action than “Wilson/Callaghan’s Children”, who came of age in the
more politicized 1960s and 1970s. Significantly, and in line with our
theoretical expectations, the “Blair’s Babies” generation is the least politically
engaged of all. We reflect on these findings and highlight the concerning
implications of falling levels of activism for advanced democracies.
Introduction
The role of political socialization in explaining disengagement from specific
modes of activism beyond voting remains largely unexplored, limited to
date by available data and methods. While most previous studies have
tended to propose explanations for disengagement linked to specific reper-
toires of political action (e.g. Franklin 2004), we propose a unified theory
based on the contexts of socialization of subsequent generations. We test
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this theory using a new dataset of collated waves of the British Social Attitudes
Survey (BSAS1) and by applying age–period–cohort (APC) models for repeated
cross-sectional data with a categorized generation variable as well as generalized
additivemodels (GAMs)withyear of birthas a continuous variable to identify gen-
erational effects through two different methods and add robustness to our
results. We show that generational effects underlie the participatory decline
across repertoires (Grasso 2016). Consistent with our theoretical expectations,
the results show that the generation that came of political age during the
1980s – “Thatcher’s Children” – is less politically involved than the generation
that cameof age in the rathermorepoliticized1960s–1970s– “Wilson/Callaghan’s
Children” – and this finding holds across different repertoires of political action.
Moreover, the Millennial generation – “Blair’s Babies” – emerges as the least
engagedof all.We reflect on these results in the conclusionandhighlight the con-
cerning implications of falling levels of activism for advanced democracies.
Participation and democracy
Citizen participation lies at the heart of a healthy democracy (Barber 1984) and
yet there have been growing concerns about political disengagement in
advanced democracies (Gray and Caul 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Pattie
and Johnston 2001; Hay 2007; Van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012; Grasso
2016). This decline in participation is said to leave democracy “hollowed
out” (Mair 2006). Falling turnout levels are particularly alarming since they
call into question the representative claims of democratic government
(Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2003; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004).
Contrary to this negative picture, scholars studying unconventional or protest
participation tend to present a more positive picture (Grasso 2018; Grasso and
Guigni 2018 Forthcoming). These scholars argue that since the post-war
period there has been a growth in engagement in public demonstrations and
other modes of protest activism, such as signing petitions, boycotting products
or companies, joining new social movement organizations, etc. (Inglehart 1977;
Inglehart 1990; Norris 1999; Norris 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Marsh,
O’Toole, and Jones 2007; Mayer 2010; Guigni and Grasso 2015). In the words
of key authors, advanced democracies have now become “social movement
societies” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) marked by the “normalization of protest”
(Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).
Given these considerations, any study of political engagement in advanced
democracies must analyse participation in both conventional and
1The BSAS series began in 1983. It is based on an annual random probability, face-to-face survey of
approximately 3000 Britons. The series is designed to act as a counterpart to other large-scale govern-
ment surveys such as the Labour Force Survey or the General Lifestyle Survey, which provide data on
behavioural actions and tangible “facts”. It has been conducted every year since 1983, except in 1988
and 1992.
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unconventional political actions (Giugni and Grasso 2017; Grasso et al. 2017).
By shedding light on the variation that underlies these long-term trends in
political participation, it is possible to assess the state of democracy in
advanced societies (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007). In order to examine the question
of the extent of inequalities in political participation and underlying trends
of political disengagement, we must compare different political generations
and use methods that aim to distinguish those differences due to age, time
period and generational cohorts (Grasso 2016).
Inter-generational change and changing patterns of
participation
Social change occurs through generational replacement and therefore the
analysis of generational patterns of participation can allow us to establish the
sources of any long-term trends (Grasso 2016). This is because as older gener-
ations die out, they are replaced by new generations exhibiting new patterns of
behaviour (Franklin 2004). Moreover, the years of youth are “impressionable” so
that the characteristics of an epoch tend to mould their imprint on those
“coming of age” in that period (Mannheim 1928). While this idea was first
famously articulated by Mannheim (1928), research on APC effects has since
repeatedly shown that generations can differ markedly in their values and pol-
itical behaviours (see for e.g. Tilley 2001; Tilley 2002; Grasso 2014; Neundorf and
Niemi 2014; Tilley and Evans 2014; Grasso 2016; Grasso et al. 2017).
Franklin (2004) notably examined the role of cohort effects in explaining
turnout decline in Western Europe. This research showed that turnout
decline results from younger generations participating at lower rates than
older generations. However, the explanations offered by Franklin focused
on factors strictly related to elections and turnout such as the closeness of
the race. As such, there was no discussion in this seminal study of how political
socialization might also explain disengagement from unconventional along-
side conventional activism. To address this important gap in the literature,
in this paper, we show that similar generational effects underlie participatory
decline in both repertoires. While previous studies have tended to propose
explanations for (dis-)engagement linked to specific repertoires of political
action, we propose a unified theory which pertains to both conventional
and unconventional domains based on the different political contexts of
socialization.
We argue that politicization and the contestation of ideas are key elements
determining the extent to which citizens are motivated to engage in politics
and to participate politically (Hay 2004). The political contexts in which differ-
ent political generations have come of age in Britain are markedly different in
terms of the extent of political contestation of key ideas (English et al. 2016;
Grasso et al. 2017; Temple et al. 2017). The context of socialization of
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“Wilson/Callaghan’s Children” – those socialized during the 1960s and 1970s –
was one of much greater politicization relative to those of the Second World
War and immediate post-war generations. The Cold War was still raging and
militant groups, particularly on the Left, multiplied across the Western world.
Events such as the world-wide revolts of 1968 symbolized the progressive
potential of the era and the generation coming of age in this period came
to be known as “the protest generation” (Jennings 1987). In contrast, the
late 1970s brought with them economic crisis and the rise of New Right poli-
tics. The 1980s were marked by a political shift towards neoliberal market
economies in many Western democracies. The rise of the New Right most
clearly signalled a rightward shift in opinion in the United States, United
Kingdom and other Anglo-American democracies in the 1980s (Himmelstein
1990; Le Grande and Bartlett 1993). “Thatcher’s Children” – socialized during
the 1980s and early 1990s – thus came of age in an era which emphasized
individualism and self-reliance over collective pursuits such as political partici-
pation for social change which had been so central previously (Clarke et al.
2004). This political epoch was marked by a shift away from collective wage
bargaining and corporatist governance towards private ownership and
control of many previously publicly owned enterprises and the decline in
union membership (Gamble 1988). Individuals, rather than collectives, came
to be seen as the key units of society (Gamble 1988).
Soon, other advanced democracies also followed with neoliberal reforms
as social democratic parties distanced themselves from socialist ideals and
moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum across Europe (Mair
2006). While ideological contestation still existed in this phase of “normative
neoliberalism” (Hay 2004) where Thatcher’s Children were coming of age
(Grasso et al. 2017), a consensus was increasingly emerging over the contem-
porary model of market-based economics married to limited social protec-
tions. This “normalised neoliberalism” phase (Hay 2004) emerged in the
aftermath of the Cold War, as even leftist political opponents from social
democratic parties previously favouring state ownership and nationalization
of major industries as well as much wider universalized social welfare
systems had come to internalize its market precepts as “the rules of the
game” (Grasso et al. 2017). As such, “Blair’s Babies” – the generation socialized
in the years of New Labour – grew up in an epoch marked by the depoliticiza-
tion of public debate in the wake of “TINA” (“there is no alternative” – to the
market) and the acceptance of neoliberal ideology by the Labour Party. More-
over, this process had led to the rise of technocratic imperatives and the sug-
gestion that questions of politics have now become simply questions of good
governmental management, devoid of normative meaning (Mair 2006). In this
context, politicians tend increasingly to portray their decisions as above con-
testation in an effort to evoke consensus (Hay 2007). In the process, they avoid
political arguments in favour of technocratic reason, often appealing to
4 M. T. GRASSO ET AL.
external economic constraints that they are powerless to shape in the process.
This avoids the disagreement that has traditionally been at the heart of
politics and presents elite decision-making as void of ideology (Mair 2006).
Thus, depoliticization can be seen as a major factor alienating the public,
and particularly younger generations, from politics in presenting the
impression that there is no normative underpinning to elite decision-
making and that all the political questions have already been solved (Hay
2007).
In this paper, we build on these insights and analyse whether those that
came of age in distinct political eras have different proclivities for engage-
ment as would be deduced from the period of their socialization. What are
the differences in political engagement between generations that came of
age during the highly politicized 1960s and 1970s (Wilson/Callaghan’s
Children), under the “normative neoliberalism” of the Thatcher and Major
governments (Thatcher’s Children), and during the “normalized neoliberal-
ism” of New Labour (Blair’s Babies)? We theorize that while less active than
the “protest generation” that came of age during the Wilson and Callaghan
years, that Thatcher’s Children (also sometimes referred to as “Generation
X” in popular culture) who came of age during the 1980s may still be more
participatory than Blair’s Babies (also sometimes referred to as the “Millen-
nials”), as depoliticization peaked during the latter generation’s formative
years.
Scholars have tended to argue for a decline of conventional partici-
pation. On the other hand, they have argued for a rise in protest activism
such as demonstrating, petition-signing and boycotting, seen also as
replacing conventional activism (Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b). We
hypothesize that we should see similar generational patterns across
modes of political action. We thus challenge the conventional substitution
thesis, since we expect the same underlying processes of depoliticization
to be at play across all activities. While Grasso (2016) provided some evi-
dence using European survey data, here we focus on the specifics of the
British context and draw on data that covers a greater number of impor-
tant control variables from the BSAS as newly collated in a harmonized
repeated cross-sectional dataset (Jennings et al. 2015), to add empirical
breadth to this theorizing. While previous studies hypothesized that
younger generations coming of age since the 1960–1970s will have a
greater propensity to engage in unconventional activities, following the
political generations account we hypothesize that:
H0: Generational patterns for conventional and unconventional forms of political
participation will be similar (contrary to the substitution thesis)
H1: Thatcher’s Children are less likely than previous generations to engage in all
political activities
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H2: Blair’s Babies are less likely than Thatcher’s Children to engage in all political
activities
In the remainder of the paper, we first outline influential theories of political
engagement. After this theoretical section, we discuss the data and methods
employed, followed by the presentation of results. We conclude with a discus-
sion of the implications of our findings.
Determinants of political engagement
Brady (1999, 739) notes how participation has four key characteristics: action,
citizens, politics and influence. One set of activities focuses around voting,
elections and parties and is normally understood as “conventional”; this has
been traditionally distinguished from “unconventional” acts or protest acti-
vism such as demonstrating, signing a petition, joining a boycott, etc. (Ingle-
hart 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005;
Dalton 2008). In addition to voting and campaign activities, conventional par-
ticipation includes different types of community-based actions, contacting
activities (elected legislators, officials, the media, etc.) and working with
others to address issues/solve problems (Verba and Nie 1972). Unconven-
tional activities encompass more “low risk” forms of protest such as signing
a petition or joining a boycott or attending demonstrations and more costly
or “high risk” forms such as occupations, illegal protests and even violence.
Several key theories from political science, political sociology and social
movement studies allow us to draw out the key individual-level determinants
of participation which might help to explain generational inequalities in pol-
itical action. In other words, while “net” generational differences show differ-
ences in socialization, there are different potential narratives as to what lies
behind them. In this way, political socialization is an additional factor that
needs to be taken into account in analyses of political participation and not
one that is contained in any of the below categories. Political generations
are distinguished through their socialization experiences in particular political
and historical contexts as famously articulated by Mannheim (1928). Much
research has shown that generations coming of age in specific periods tend
to exhibit characteristics that differentiate them from each other in both
values and political behaviours (Tilley 2001; Tilley 2002; Grasso 2011; Bartels
and Jackman 2014; Grasso 2014; Neundorf and Niemi 2014; Tilley and Evans
2014). In Britain, “Thatcher’s Children” (Russell, Johnston, and Pattie 1992;
Heath and Park 1997), the generation that came of age during Thatcher’s
and Major’s time in office (between 1979 and 1997), has been the object of
a number of studies.
However, other than socialization, there are other potentially confounding
influences distinguishing generations that could explain variations in differing
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rates of participation. A number of factors have been identified as important
in studies of political participation. A first group of factors explaining political
participation with respect to various socio-demographic characteristics have
been highlighted primarily in the biographical availability model (McAdam
1986). It is important to take socio-demographic factors into account when
testing for socialization effects since younger individuals tend to be more
likely to be in education, unmarried and free from obligations of careers
and families and thus more “biographically available” to participate. Moreover,
young people will tend to be less invested in their careers and thus have more
time and the mental energy to get involved in and commit to politics; they are
less likely to have entered marriage2 and to have children: both things which
decrease free time and the willingness to take risks (Wiltfang and McAdam
1991). This literature also suggests that people in full-time employment will
be less likely to participate (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McAdam 1986).
However, McAdam (1986) and Nepstad and Smith (1999) demonstrated
that people in full-time (inflexible) employment were more likely to partici-
pate; this has also been found to vary by commitment (Saunders et al. 2012).
The civic voluntarism model also highlights socio-demographic variables,
and particularly education and class, as very important given the argument
that people who are better off and more resource-rich, more middle class,
better educated, with higher incomes, are more likely to participate (Parry,
Moyser, and Day 1992; Brady, Verba, and Scholzman 1995; Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995). However, the civic voluntarism model moves beyond this
and conceptualizes resources widely, including time (Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995). It also links resources to political engagement at the psychologi-
cal level (Schussman and Soule 2005). Feelings of involvement with the politi-
cal system and of mobilization, normally through organizational membership,
are emphasized since individuals must be elicited in their participation (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). And indeed, research has shown the importance
of campaigning by political parties for mobilization (Seyd and Whiteley 1992;
Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995)
or asking people to protest (Schussman and Soule 2005). Other than political
interest, consumption of political information such as newspaper readership
matters (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Ideology is also seen as impor-
tant as more liberal individuals are normally seen as more likely to engage
in political activities aimed at challenging the status quo (Hirsch 1990;
Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Schussman and Soule 2005; Dalton 2008).
Organizational membership and embeddedness in social networks facilitat-
ing the recruitment to political action (McAdam 1986; Passy 2001; Passy and
Giugni 2001) are also emphasized by the structural availability model. Since
2
“[A] set of commitments that may supersede loyalties to the movement, especially if only one spouse is
involved with activism” (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991, 997).
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organizations forge ties between people, they multiply the possibilities that
individuals will be mobilized to action – through the flow of information,
through persuasion, etc. (Oberschall 1973; McAdam 1986; Paulsen 1991;
McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Another way in which organizations can
promote participation is by developing civic skills (Brady, Verba, and Scholzman
1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Building on insights from the original
rational choicemodel,Whiteley and Seyd’s general incentivesmodel (Seyd and
Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1996;
Whiteley and Seyd 1998) combines rational choice and social psychological
models. They emphasize the role of expressive incentives (e.g. group attach-
ment) as well as system benefits (e.g. a sense of duty) and collective benefits
for participation. The social capital model also sees organizational member-
ships as important and emphasizes trust (Putnam 1993); the trust that is devel-
oped through voluntary activities spills over into other spheres of social,
political and economic life, leading to more well-governed, affluent and politi-
cally engaged citizenries (Putnam 1993; Hall 1999; Whiteley 2000).
The cognitive mobilizationmodel in particular emphasizes the role of dissa-
tisfaction and grievances, in line with the social psychological model (Van Ste-
kelenburg and Klandermans 2013), and suggests that individuals with higher
levels of education, political interest and political information will be more
likely to become dissatisfied with political outcomes and inclined to protest
(Skocpol 1979; Norris 1999; Dalton 2008). As such grievances could also play
an important role in explaining participation. Indeed, one of the oldest
models of participation, developed with reference to revolutions, is the per-
ceived equity-fairness or relative deprivation model employed by social histor-
ians (Hobsbawm1962; Skocpol 1979) and social scientists in various forms such
as the J-form and frustration-aggression hypotheses and strain or breakdown
theories (Davies 1962; Runciman 1966; Gurr 1970). Here it is particularly empha-
sized that what drives individuals to engage in political activism is a sense of
injustice, particularly in relation to some reference group.
Data and methods
In order to analyse APC effects on political engagement and explain genera-
tional differences, this paper uses a publicly available collation of the BSAS data-
sets (see Jennings et al. 2015). The repeated cross-sectional dataarenecessary to
disentangle APC effects and as such we could not utilize data spanning shorter
periods that include a larger battery of activities such as the Citizen’s Audit
(Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2003; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004). The analysis
of political activism is based on eight indicators included in the survey between
1983 and 2012, covering three of the dimensions identified by seminal studies
(Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995; Pattie,
Seyd, andWhiteley 2003; Pattie, Seyd, andWhiteley 2004): contacting activities,
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group activities and protest activities. These variables will measure both tra-
ditional and newer (e.g. electronic or internet-based) forms of political activity.3
Generational theories tend to argue that the context of one’s socialization is
the most important factor for understanding differences in values. To capture
generational differences, we need to develop methods that allow us to address
the potentially confounding influences of age and period effects. Age effects
suggest that participation trajectories change with social ageing and indeed
research has found that older people are more likely than younger people to
be involved in conventional activities whereas younger people are more likely
to engage in protest activism (Dalton 2008). Moreover, certain historical
moments – or periods – are understood to stimulate more general participation.
To identify generation effects, we need to control for both age and period, or year
of survey, in our models. However, given the APC “identification problem”,4 we
need to apply certain restrictions. A rich statistical literature has emerged over
the years to “solve” the “identification problem”. While there are strictly no statisti-
cal solutions to this problem, the use of theoretically informed choices can allow
simplifying assumptions to estimate the effects of interest (Tilley 2002).
In this paper, we categorize generations based on the historical period of
their formative years. Moreover, we identify the models differently through
GAMs where we use year of birth as a continuous variable and use these to
plot the identified, smoothed cohort effect. In this way, the GAMs add robust-
ness to the results presented in the paper since they are identified differently
from the other models. Here, we use year of birth estimated as smoothly chan-
ging whereas in the APC models, we use the theoretically informed categor-
ization of generations based on the distinct historical periods of their
formative years. Moreover, we use the results from the APC models to
conduct post-estimation Wald tests for inter-generational differences.
Given our interest in generational effects, year of birth is the main indepen-
dent variable. This ranges from 1910 to 1990 in our survey data. The key
period of socialization will largely depend on the mechanism hypothesized
(Inglehart 1990, 1977; Bartels and Jackman 2014). Given our hypotheses rely
on political awareness, we would expect that socialization should occur
during the mid-teens to the mid- to late twenties (Jennings and Niemi
1974). We assign individuals to different political generations based on the
historical phase in which they spent the majority of their formative years
(see Grasso et al. 2017). As such, we define Thatcher’s Children as those
born between 1959 and 1976 and coming of age in the protracted period
3Unfortunately, indicators asking for participation in the last year are not available so we rely on the “have you
ever” questions. However, evidence suggests that people have rather shorter reference points in mind when
answering this question and studies comparing generational trends through APC analysis using both the
“ever” and “last 12 months” question show similar generational trends (see Grasso 2016).
4The three effects are in a linear relationship with each other; as soon as we now two values we know the
third: Year of Birth = Year–Age.
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of Conservative rule between 1979 and 1996. This generation and the others
analysed in this study are presented in Table 1.
This method of categorizing generations has the advantage that it places
emphasis on the historical period of a generation’s socialization. The years
of birth of the political generations are then derived from this information.
We include the categorized political generations variable in the APC
models5 in order to (1) cross-check the robustness of the results from the
GAMs and (2) use Wald tests to test for cohort differences. In the GAMs, we
use the continuous year of birth variable to derive the smoothed cohort
effects which means the models in the GAMs are identified differently to
those from the regression models. Other than year of birth/cohort, we also
control for age and period to identify the APC models. Age is a three-level
factor coded: (1) 34 years and younger; (2) 35–59 years; (3) over 60 years.6
We also control for year of survey as a linear term since the literature on par-
ticipation extensively argues that we are witnessing a decline in conventional
political participation on the one hand and a rise in unconventional partici-
pation on the other (see Norris 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Hay 2007).
Based on our earlier discussion ofmodels of political participation, we control
for a number of salient factors identified in the literature thatmight contribute to
observed generational differences in rates of participation. By controlling for age
and period aswell as these effects, we can then analyse “net” generational differ-
ences in participation – in otherwords, the residual, or “pure”generational effect.
In order to do this, we therefore operationalize the insights from the theories of
political engagement discussed above. We control for gender, employment
status (being unemployed cf. Dunn et al. 2014), student status, marital status
and having children.7We also include a control for ethnic group sinceminorities
have also traditionally been a relatively deprived group in British society (Clarke
Table 1. Political generations.
(1) Pre-WWII
generation
(2) Post-WWII
generation
(3) Wilson/
Callaghan’s
Children (1960s/
1970s generation)
(4) Thatcher’s
Children (1980s
generation)
(5) Blair’s
Babies
(Millennials)
Formative
period
1930–1944
(14 years)
1945–1964
(18 years)
1965–1978
(13 years)
1979–1996
(18 years)
1997–2010
(13 years)
Years of
birth
1910–1924 1925–1944 1945–1958 1959–1976 1977–1990
Total N
(%)
8435
(9.61%)
23,181
(26.41%)
21,653
(24.67%)
27,527
(31.36%)
6980
(7.95%)
Source: British Social Attitudes 1986–2011.
5Wilson/Callaghan’s Children is used as the reference category in the APC models since we expect this to
be the most participatory generation based on their period of socialization.
6The first age group is used as the reference category in the APC models so other age groups are com-
pared to the young.
7The variable for children in the household was missing between 1993 and 2001 so instead we include a
dummy for three or more individuals in the household.
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et al. 2004, 240). Moreover, we include income, social class (manual occupation)8
and education level, private education and home ownership for resources. For
organizational membership, we include an indicator for union/staff association
membership. We also include party attachment (whether individuals identify
with a party or not), newspaper readership and ideology in the form of an
item measuring left–right values (“Government should redistribute from the
better off to the less well off”) and another for libertarian–authoritarian
values (“Schools should teach children to obey authority”). Additionally, for
grievances for participation, we use the item “Management will always try
and get the better of employees” to capture this dimension. Moreover, we
include institutional trust (“How much do you trust British governments of
any party to put the needs of the country first.”). We do not have an indicator
of social trust available. Finally, we noted how the relative deprivation model
emphasizes a sense of injustice, particularly in relation to some reference
group, as spurring people to action and as such we include an item picking
up on this dimension (“There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.”).
Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table A1 in the
Online Appendix.
Results
First, we describe levels of participation by political generation from Table 2.
Note that in these descriptive statistics, generation effects are not isolated
from the confounding influences of age and period and therefore differences
in the fully identified APC models may turn out to be much larger – or smaller.
As shown in Table 2, the first and third most popular activities on the list are
the two forms of protest activism: signing a petition (43%) and demonstrating
(11%). While even the large proportion that have signed a petition still do not
match up to the proportion of the population that turns out to vote, this is at
least some evidence of the “normalization of protest” in Britain. It is particu-
larly interesting that over 10% of the population on average have engaged
in the relatively costly act of attending a protest. Overall, almost 50% of the
British public have engaged in some form of protest activism (which includes
signing a petition based on classic definitions in the literature). The overall
second most popular activity was contacting an MP (17%). The other contact-
ing activities (contacting a government department, the media, an influential
person) are not as popular in comparison, with 22% of the British public
having contacted for political reasons. Group activities (raising an issue with
a group and forming a group) are by far the least popular, being only practised
8The “Registrar-General’s Social Classes” were introduced in 1913 and were renamed in 1990 as “Social
Class based on Occupation”. Note that a few individuals will change social class over time because of
changes in the classification of occupations. In 1981, the 1980 Classification was used, in 1991, it was
the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90) and in 2001, this was replaced by SOC2000.
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by 2–5% on average. This is hardly surprising since group activities are invari-
ably the most costly and resource-intensive modes of political action.
From the same table, we note that the Thatcher’s Children and Blair’s
Babies stand out as being less participatory than older generations. With
respect to contacting and group activities, Thatcher’s Children are as disen-
gaged as the earliest generation; Blair’s Babies are even less participatory
than this. Even with respect to protest which is supposed to be the preserve
of more recent generations (Inglehart 1990), Thatcher’s Children and Blair’s
Babies are less politically engaged than the older Wilson/Callaghan’s Children
in both conventional and unconventional activities, as suggested by H0. This
particularly progressive “protest generation” coming of age in the 1960s and
1970s is the most participatory across the board, at least according to these
initial descriptive trends. We now turn to see whether these initial descriptive
results are confirmed in the APC models identified in two different ways: first
through the GAMs with the continuous year of birth variable, and then in the
APC models with the categorized generation variable.
First, we examine the results from the GAMs. In particular, we examine the
plots of the smoothed cohort effect, as presented in Figures 1–4 in the Online
Appendix, from the full model with all variables included. The curvilinear
pattern across forms of action is striking and consistent. This provides
Table 2. Levels of political activism by political generation (%).
(1) Pre-
WWII
generation
(2) Post-
WWII
generation
(3) Wilson/
Callaghan’s
Children
(1960s/1970s
generation)
(4) Thatcher’s
Children
(1980s
generation)
(5) Blair’s
Babies
(Millennials) All
Contacting
Member of
Parliament
14 20 21 14 6 17
Government
department
3 5 6 4 2 5
Media 3 6 8 5 2 6
Influential
person
3 6 7 4 3 5
All 18 26 28 19 9 22
Group activity
Issue in group 4 6 7 4 2 5
Informal group 1 2 3 1 1 2
All 5 7 9 5 3 6
Protest activism
Demonstration 3 7 15 12 9 11
Signed a
petition
27 39 48 46 39 43
All 29 41 52 48 40 45
At least one of
the above
40 52 60 54 42 53
Average
number of
acts
0.6 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9
Source: British Social Attitudes 1986–2011.
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support for our unified theory across participation acts, which moves beyond
activity-specific explanations for generational inequalities in political action.
The same patterns are found across both more conventional and unconven-
tional domains. Across all four indicators of participation, the highest point is
around the years of birth of the Post-WWII (1925–1944) and 1960s and 1970s
Wilson/Callaghan’s (1945–1958) generations. The curve slopes down on the
other hand over the years of birth of Thatcher’s Children, or the 1980s Gener-
ation (1959–1976) and Blair’s Babies, i.e. the Millennials (1977–1990). This evi-
dence provides support for the theoretical expectations of both H1 and H2.
While the curve over the years of birth of Thatcher’s Children does not
always fall back down to the levels of the Post-WWII generation, the curves
clearly keep slowing down here (for those born during the period 1959–
1976). With respect to the political generation born between 1977 and
1990, i.e. Blair’s Babies, they are even less participatory than the Post-WWII
generation with respect to contacting activities (Figure 1). Moreover, it
looks as though group activism (Figure 2) also records low levels of involve-
ment amongst the youngest generations. It is particularly telling that even
with protest (Figure 3), which is widely argued to be the activity of choice
for younger generations, we see a downward sloping trend. This is replicated
for the overall activism measure (Figure 4).
The terms for the generation effects in the APC logistic regression models
in Table 3 confirm the results from the GAMs very clearly. Across models and
across forms of engagement, Thatcher’s Children generation and the Millen-
nial Blair Babies are less participatory than 1960s and 1970s Wilson/Calla-
ghan’s generation even in those modes of participation – such as protest
activism – that are meant to be much more commonly practised amongst
the younger generations (Inglehart 1990). Across the models, and for the
various types of participation, cohort differences generally remain robust
to the inclusion of the various control and explanatory variables in the
models – with the exception of protest activism, further discussed below –
suggesting that the political context at the time of socialization was a very
important influence in itself, and cannot generally be reduced to mediating
factors such as the development of strong feelings of party attachment or
the greater tendency to join associations. In order to make sense of where
the greatest reductions in magnitude come from, we ran a series of stepwise
models between the APC model and the full model (not shown here but
available from the authors). These models showed that for contacting, the
greatest reductions in the cohort coefficients for Thatcher’s Children and
Blair’s Babies were achieved in the civic voluntarism model, even more
than for the full model. This suggests that lower levels of political commit-
ment (ideological attachments, newspaper readership), as well in terms of
as party attachment and associational memberships/mobilization, have an
important role to play in explaining these generational differences. If
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Table 3. APC models.
(1)
Contacting
(2)
Contacting
(3)
Group
(4)
Group
(5)
Protest
(6)
Protest
(7)
Activism
(8)
Activism
APC Full model APC Full model APC Full model APC Full model
Generations
(ref.:(3) Wilson/Callaghan’s Children)
(1) Pre-WWII generation −0.29
(0.16)
−0.10
(0.16)
−0.48
(0.27)
−0.18
(0.28)
−0.77***
(0.14)
−0.65***
(0.14)
−0.65***
(0.13)
−0.52***
(0.14)
(2) Post-WWII generation 0.06
(0.10)
0.15
(0.11)
−0.07
(0.17)
0.13
(0.17)
−0.31***
(0.09)
−0.26**
(0.09)
−0.24**
(0.09)
−0.19*
(0.09)
(4) Thatcher’s Children −0.37***
(0.07)
−0.31***
(0.08)
−0.56***
(0.12)
−0.50***
(0.13)
−0.15*
(0.06)
−0.07
(0.06)
−0.22***
(0.06)
−0.15*
(0.07)
(5) Blair’s Babies 0.91***
(0.17)
−0.73***
(0.18)
−0.95**
(0.29)
−0.72*
(0.30)
−0.46***
(0.12)
−0.29*
(0.12)
−0.65***
(0.12)
−0.48***
(0.12)
Age groups
(ref. 34 years and under)
35–59 years 0.52***
(0.09)
0.58***
(0.10)
0.23
(0.16)
0.27
(0.16)
0.06
(0.07)
0.09
(0.07)
0.13
(0.07)
0.18*
(0.07)
Over 60 years 0.30*
(0.15)
0.50**
(0.16)
0.02
(0.25)
0.27
(0.26)
−0.11
(0.13)
0.02
(0.13)
−0.02
(0.13)
0.14
(0.13)
Year of Survey 0.03***
(0.01)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.00)
0.01
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
Female −0.20***
(0.05)
−0.26**
(0.09)
0.11*
(0.04)
0.04
(0.04)
Married −0.02
(0.06)
−0.17
(0.10)
0.05
(0.05)
0.03
(0.05)
3+ Household −0.04
(0.06)
0.02
(0.11)
−0.08
(0.05)
0.06
(0.05)
Minority −0.25*
(0.13)
−0.14
(0.21)
−0.36***
(0.10)
−0.38***
(0.10)
High income 0.12
(0.07)
0.13
(0.11)
0.06
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
Manual occupation −0.55***
(0.06)
−0.71***
(0.11)
−0.34***
(0.05)
−0.41***
(0.05)
1
4
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Education 19 years+ 0.49***
(0.07)
0.55***
(0.10)
0.39***
(0.06)
0.47***
(0.06)
Unemployed 0.24
(0.13)
0.13
(0.22)
0.08
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Student 0.40
(0.27)
0.37
(0.42)
0.36
(0.22)
0.39
(0.22)
Home owner 0.23***
(0.07)
0.07
(0.11)
0.10
(0.05)
0.13*
(0.05)
Private education 0.44***
(0.07)
0.55***
(0.11)
0.28***
(0.07)
0.38***
(0.07)
Newspaper 3 + days/week 0.16**
(0.05)
0.01
(0.09)
0.04
(0.04)
0.11*
(0.04)
Union/staff associat. 0.33***
(0.06)
0.54***
(0.09)
0.31***
(0.05)
0.38***
(0.05)
Party attachment 0.46***
(0.10)
0.61**
(0.20)
0.50***
(0.07)
0.52***
(0.07)
Left–right (5 = Left) 0.11***
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.04)
0.03
(0.02)
0.05*
(0.02)
Lib–Auth (5 = Auth) −0.13***
(0.03)
−0.29***
(0.05)
−0.13***
(0.03)
−0.12***
(0.03)
Grievances 0.04
(0.03)
0.12*
(0.05)
0.02
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
Institutional trust −0.02
(0.04)
0.06
(0.06)
−0.09**
(0.03)
−0.07*
(0.03)
Injustice 0.06
(0.03)
0.10
(0.05)
0.12***
(0.03)
0.09***
(0.03)
Duty −0.11***
(0.03)
−0.10*
(0.05)
−0.16***
(0.02)
−0.16***
(0.02)
Constant −54.49***
(10.24)
−60.08***
(11.01)
−24.64
(16.68)
−32.39
(17.92)
−17.00*
(8.25)
16.38
(8.86)
−21.38**
(8.18)
−23.04**
(8.83)
N 9619 9619 9619 9619 9619 9619 9619 9619
Log lik. −4969.13 −4691.41 −2275.96 −2077.60 −6546.32 −6300.72 −6574.55 −6271.52
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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individuals are not ideologically committed nor mobilized to political action
through parties or other associations, it is unlikely that they will engage in
contacting acts.
Moving on to the results for group activity, as with contacting, the civic
voluntarism model did particularly well in terms of contributing to the expla-
nation for why Thatcher’s Children and Blair’s Babies are less politically
active than Wilson/Callaghan’s Children. Once again, political engagement
(ideological commitment, newspaper readership), as well as party attach-
ment and mobilization variables, in particular, appear important for explain-
ing generational differences: younger generations have weaker left-wing
beliefs and are less likely to be mobilized (Grasso et al. 2017). As such, it is
not surprising that they are less likely to form formal and informal groups
struggling for political causes relative to the more politicized Wilson/Calla-
ghan’s Children.
Moving onto the results for protest activism, those models that include
associational memberships or party attachment fully explain the lower
protest proclivities of Thatcher’s Children relative to Wilson/Callaghan’s Chil-
dren, as the generational coefficient ceases to be statistically significant.
The civic voluntarism model also stands out as accounting for the greatest
reduction in the generational effect for Blair’s Babies, suggesting once again
that leftist political beliefs, mobilization and party attachment are the key vari-
ables linking socialization in Britain to decreased political activism amongst
these younger generations. In addition, both the cognitive mobilization grie-
vances and relative deprivation injustice variables fare better than they did for
the previous two forms of participation.
For overall activism, we also found the civic voluntarism model variables
tended to explain away a greater proportion of the generational differences.
Once again, the political engagement (ideological commitment), party attach-
ment and mobilization variables look like they hold the most promise for pro-
viding part of the explanation for why Thatcher’s Children and Blair’s Babies
are less participatory than Wilson/Callaghan’s Children. They are less progress-
ive ideologically, and less likely to hold strong political beliefs, they are more
atomized and isolated and less likely to feel attached to parties and join
associations. As such, they are less likely to have both the mental and struc-
tural resources to get involved in political activism
Finally, to conclude our analysis, Table A2 in the Online Appendix presents
the results of Wald tests checking for coefficient differences between the
dummy variables included in the models (whereas in the models we can
only test for differences with respect to the reference category). Blair’s
Babies are even less participatory than Thatcher’s Children across modes of
participation with the exception of group activity. Results presented in
Table A2 also show that the Post-WWII generation is more participatory
than both Thatcher’s Children and Blair’s Babies in both contacting and
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group activities, and also overall in the case of the latter. These results clearly
confirm both H1 and H2. The youngest Blair’s Babies are even less involved in
contacting activities than the Pre-WWII generation.
Conclusions
We argue that politicization and the contestation of ideas are key elements
determining the extent to which citizens are motivated to engage in politics
(Hay 2004). The political contexts in which the studied generations came of
age are markedly different in terms of the political contestation of key
ideas. The 1960s and 1970s Wilson/Callaghan generation came to be
known as “the protest generation” (Jennings 1987) in many countries across
the world, including in Europe. In contrast, while ideological contestation
still existed in this phase of “normative neoliberalism”, a consensus was
increasingly emerging over the contemporary model of market-based econ-
omics married to limited social protections (Mair 2006). This “normalised neo-
liberalism” phase emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, as even leftist
political opponents came to accept it (Grasso et al. 2017). On this basis, we
theorized that while less active than the “protest generation” of Wilson/Call-
aghan’s Children (coming of age during the 1960s and 1970s), the 1980s
Thatcher’s Children generation may still be more participatory than Blair’s
Babies or the Millennials, as depoliticization peaked during the formative
years of the latter generation. We tested this theory by using a new dataset
of collated waves of the BSAS and showed that the generation that came
of political age during Thatcher’s heyday in the 1980s was much less politically
involved than prior generations across different repertoires; Blair’s Babies gen-
eration emerged as the least engaged of all.
More broadly, our results show that we should be very concerned about
declining levels of democratic participation in advanced democracies
(Putnam 2000; Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Grasso 2014; Giugni and Grasso
2018c Forthcoming). Even for protest activism, which is widely identified as
the political repertoire of choice for younger generations in the theoretical lit-
erature, the increasing generational trend was halted and put into reverse.
Against the expectations of prominent theories, inter-generational replace-
ment is thus likely to lead to less, not more, participant publics in the future
(Grasso 2016). The declining trend in civic engagement is not rescued
through rising unconventional participation (Norris 2002; Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). Based on these results, inter-generational replacement would
lead to a deeper “Democratic Deficit” (Norris 2011) rather than a “Democratic
Phoenix” (Norris 2002). While patterns of turnout among younger generations
in the 2017 British General Election might have shown some signs of recovery,
it is far too early to conclude whether this marks a lasting change or a tempor-
ary deviation from the long-term trajectory (Grasso 2013).
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Overall, our results show that political activism is likely to continue to
fall in the future unless a new politicized generation emerges. The gener-
ation coming of age now in this age of populism, political division, iden-
tity politics, nationalism and social media may well be distinct from the
generations that came before it (Grasso 2014; Grasso and Bessant 2018).
How these trends unfold will be enlightening, and only time will tell
whether fallout from the economic crisis and the increasing fragmentation
of party systems in advanced democracies will alter these trajectories
(Grasso et al. 2017; Giugni and Grasso 2018a, Lahusen and Grasso 2018).
Social fragmentation and the decline of political loyalties may give rise
to an era of concerted “identity” politics in which personal action may dis-
place collective action (Bennett 2013).
Moreover, this research has shown that the civic voluntarism model is
particularly useful for explaining generational differences in participation.
It appears that ideological commitment, party attachment and mobiliz-
ation, in addition to the socialization experiences in a given historical
context, contribute to explaining the lower engagement levels of the
youngest generations. Most importantly, this paper has shown that the “for-
mative experiences” of new generations can affect the political behaviour
trajectories and patterns of activism of entire nations. Our results, for
both conventional and unconventional participation, raise fresh concerns
about declining political involvement in advanced democracies.
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